Decentralization and Citizen Participation in Latin America: Deepening or Dooming Democracy?

In studying the relatively recently democratized countries of Latin America, scholars have largely moved beyond the theme of transitions to democratically-elected governments and have begun to ask questions regarding the kind of democracies that have arisen and how to sustain democratic practices. Almost uniformly, political analysts and actors deplore the quality of the new democracies, pointing to one or another deficiency, including ineffective legislatures, inefficient public bureaucracies, corrupt judiciaries, and, perhaps most strikingly given their mobilization during transitions, apathetic citizens. Leaders across the political spectrum have continually advocated civic renewal. Noting the “somewhat artificial, weak, and formal” character of democratic regimes in the region, former Chilean president Patricio Aylwin recalls that the first summit of Latin American presidents issued a declaration that “democracy requires ‘a powerful and diverse civil society’ and ‘broad participation by the whole society in public affairs’” (1998:5,6). Yet he recognizes, as do most scholars, that “civil society in most of our countries is weak, fragmented, and lacking in the organization needed for effective participation, [and that] formal institutions themselves provide inadequate opportunities for participation” (1998:6). In order to move beyond lamenting the region’s democratic deficiencies, my proposal is to study the few cases where local governments have created participatory institutions and an active citizenry has sustained them.

The dissertation will focus on two central questions: First, why have a few mayors been successful in implementing widespread citizen participation in political decision-making processes while many others have not? My hypothesis is that the more decentralized the political system and the less clientelistic and confrontational the strategy used by mayors and social movements, the greater the success. Second, in those cities where participatory programs became institutionalized, what were their effects on government and citizen performance? Here, the competing hypotheses include that improved performance is more likely where the participants’ economic conditions are more equal, where elites and/or public workers are included in rather than threatened by the participation process, and where partisan and factional disputes are minimized. In order to answer the first question, I will examine the secondary literature on the attempts to create participatory institutions in about twenty major Latin American municipalities. For the second question, I will concentrate on the municipal administrations in three cities: those of the Workers’ Party (PT) in Porto Alegre, the Broad Front (FA) in Montevideo, and the Radical Cause (LCR) in Libertador (Caracas). After I address the importance of the dissertation’s topic and the basis for case selection, I will set out the separate research programs for each question.

Why Study Local Urban Politics in an Era of Globalization?

Two central reasons dictate the need for scholarly attention to urban politics in the global age. The first comes from a series of empirical observations. In Latin America, cities are where
the majority of people live and where poverty is concentrated. Latin America has been the region with the most urbanized population since the 1960s, and as of 1992 it leads the world at a rate of 71% urbanization (Dillinger 1994:5), with nearly a third of the population living in cities with over a million inhabitants (Angotti 1996). In Brazil, over two-thirds of the poor live in urban areas, and nearly one-third of the poor and one-third of all Brazilians live in the nine regions with over a million inhabitants (Valladares & Coelho 1995). Urban poverty has been growing in the eighties and nineties for other countries in the region as well (Burki & Edwards 1996; Wilkie 1997), and already 55 percent of the poor were urban by 1986 (Reilly 1993:5). During the same time, as many governments reduced government spending (whether due to the debt crisis or neoliberal governing doctrines), urban service provision, including water, sanitation, solid waste collection, education, health, and transportation, was and remains far from adequate (Dillinger 1994:5; McCarney 1996, 7). The region-wide trends of urbanization and impoverishment have coincided with the moves towards democratization (in most cases both nationally and locally)\(^1\) and decentralization beginning in the 1980s, which have meant that central governments have passed on ever greater tasks to the municipal level, though they have not always devolved the resources necessary to perform them. Local governments are now even being burdened with attempting poverty alleviation (Bava 1996) and simultaneously providing high quality services and a livable environment to retain or attract both national and transnational enterprises in this age of increased capital mobility (Borja and Castells 1997:3; McCarney 1996:7). The last current converging in the "lost decade" was the rise of urban popular movements and the eruption of several popular riots, perhaps most famously the "Caracazo" in Venezuela. This seems to point to the simultaneous advance in organization of civil society for some and the erosion of social fabric and atomization for others. All of these observations highlight the fundamental importance given to local, and especially urban, governments to improve the quality of life for citizens and the need for scholars to evaluate their efforts to do so.

The second reason that the topic is worthy is that until quite recently, Latin American local politics were understudied, and the current boom of scholarship on the subject has yet to produce compelling cross-national comparative analyses of municipal governments. The majority of the new works can be placed in four groups. One focuses on providing prescriptions for local politicians and activists, such as Shuman's (1998) *Going Local* and Borja & Castells’ (1997) *Local & Global*, which, among other things, offer competing perspectives concerning the importance of attracting extra-local business.\(^2\) Another group consists of studies of one or two cases of municipal governance, yielding useful but not necessarily generalizable insights (including Winn 1995; Nylen 1995; Schönwalder 1998). Edited volumes collecting single-case studies with disparate foci and explanatory frameworks, and yielding conclusions of limited import, comprise a third group (Reilly 1995; Dietz & Shidlo 1998; Ziccardi 1991). The fourth group includes a

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1. Democratization of local politics has come recently to both new and "old" democracies. Venezuela has held regular elections regularly since the early 1960s, but municipal elections were separated from the general elections and voters allowed to elect different parties at different levels of government only in the late 1980s.

2. Neither of these is geared solely or primarily towards Latin American audiences.
small number of singly-authored short articles which compare several municipal governments along interesting dimensions, but focus only on Brazilian cities (Bava 1995; Abers 1996; Jacobi 1994). The normative and policy importance of local politics and the lack of comparative knowledge present in the literature, in addition to the potential contributions to general theories of decentralization, participation, and State-Society relations, make the attempt at systematic comparative analysis of municipal governments crucial. McCarney (1996:10) elicits a call for a study exactly like my own:

Studies on decentralization have not been well integrated with studies on democratization, nor with the more recent discussions on governance. It has become clear that decentralization in no way guarantees more representative and accountable, nor more democratic, government at the local level. If better governance is to be achieved in cities throughout the world, the linkages between the various streams of research on democratization, decentralization and urban governance now need to be re-focused through a single lens.

Case Selection

In general, throughout Latin America, "[l]ocal gov't has traditionally been a means for legitimizing elite power," mostly through patron-client networks (Angotti 1996:24-5). Despite the fact that political parties of all stripes have declared their democratic principles and promoted the ideal of an active citizenry, there is considerable debate over the merits of citizen participation (see below), and only rarely have parties in local (or national) office created participatory institutions (Shifter 1997:120; Aylwin 1998:6). Even parties with long histories of opposition to authoritarian rule and strong democratic principles, such as Mexico’s PAN and Argentina’s Radical Civic Union, have not delivered opportunities for regular citizen participation. In Reilly’s volume on experiments in municipal government, Hernandez & Fox (1995:208) argue that participatory innovations have been rare in Mexico, and that those few occurred in rural areas, while Cavarozzi & Palermo (1995:35-7) describe the quick slide into clientelism in Argentine municipal politics. The few cases of successful participatory programs have come primarily from administrations led by mayors from the left of the political spectrum. As Sonia Alvarez (1993:193) puts it, the municipal governments of the Latin American Left, and particularly those of LCR, the PT, and the Frente Amplio, "stand out as islands of resistance to the tide of neoliberalism and elite-dominated democratization." A brief look at my three focus countries shows how scholars have assessed local politics historically and in the wake of decentralization, and signals the important role which the Left currently plays.

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3In addition, Marta Harnecker has published a series of interviews with Leftist municipal leaders which she collected in several books on individual administrations and one book combining interviews from different cities.

4A number of authors have pointed to Leftist municipal administrations as the leading examples of expanding democracy through participatory decentralization (e.g., Rodriguez 1993; Nylen 1996; Fox 1995).
In Venezuela, patron-client relations between citizens, parties, and the State, and a "paternalistic and passive political culture" have traditionally predominated, yet failed to disappear with the advent of decentralization in the late 1980s (Guerón & Manchisi 1996:373; see also A. Alvarez 1998 and Nickson 1995:267). While the condition of citizenship in general is "weak, precarious, and restricted" and "anomie and rootlessness predominate," a few instances of new types of citizen participation at the local level have emerged, most prominently those implemented by the Causa R in Caracas and Ciudad Bolívar (R. Alvarez 1997:175,176; also Guerón & Manchisi 1996; Ellner 1995; López Maya 1994). During the 1980s, Uruguay as a nation saw widespread disenchantment and lack of faith in political parties and leaders, a decline in social and political participation, and the degradation of the social fabric, leading to increased polarization (Sierra & Charbonnier 1993:15). In Montevideo, the Colorados had traditionally held power and had used the city government as a resource for offering clientelist exchanges (Sierra & Charbonnier 1993). In contrast to this panorama of weak citizen activism and corrupt government, “the election of the left-wing Frente Amplio coalition... led to a major initiative in citizen participation” (Nickson 1995:256; see also Winn 1995). Brazilian local governments have historically helped maintain "the traditional model of... resistance to admitting those at the bottom as collective social actors" (Prates 1996:49; see also Bava 1996:58; Costa 1996:116). Some parties attempted popular participation programs before the decentralizing 1988 constitution, especially the PMDB in São Paulo and the PDT in Rio de Janeiro, but these efforts have been characterized as clientelist and corrupted (S. Alvarez 1993; Azevedo 1988). The recent constitution even legislates, albeit nebulously, citizen participation; yet studies have shown that most of the new spaces for public input envisioned by activists and written into the organic laws of some municipalities either never came into existence (less than half of participatory planning boards have more than paper presence) or were manipulated by city councillors for patronage purposes, and PT administrations carried out the few successful cases of participation cited (Prates 1996:49; Ribeiro 1995). Thus clientelism has generally persisted in Brazilian city governments: "Municipal politics are notorious for their particularist nature, characterized by the prevalence of patronage and private interest pressures on mayors and city council members" (Prates 1996:49; see also Bava 1995; Jacobi 1994:29; Nylen 1998). Against these expectations, the PT’s experiments in participatory city government shine.5

Latin America’s left-leaning municipal governments, in contrast to municipal governments historically and currently, offer a broad set of cases of opposition parties in local office attempting to expand democracy by encouraging greater citizen participation in political affairs.6

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5Nylen (forthcoming:Fn20) notes that when the Brazilian national government "sought out the country's most successful experiences in 'innovative local government' for inclusion in an exposition at the United Nations' 1996 Habitat II Conference in Istanbul, Turkey," nearly half of the eighteen selected projects came from PT-administered cities, while about 1 percent of local governments are in petista hands.

6This list includes those governed by the already-mentioned LCR in Caroni (Ciudad Bolívar), by the PT in several major Brazilian cities, including seven state capitals, the IU in Lima and Cuzco, the PSP in Rosario, Argentina, the PRD in Mexico City, the FMLN in San Salvador, and the MCAPT in Asunción, Paraguay. All these parties are “Leftist” in that they represent the most viable legal option furthest to the left on the ideological spectrum in each of their respective countries; while a coherent new vision of socialism has yet to be developed, all of these parties are
The parties under study here all share (or contain factions within them which share) a commitment to "radical democracy," which implies the opening up of democratic participation in economic, social, and political life. This commitment to democracy is fairly new, and had several catalysts, including the re-evaluation of "democratic centralism" before and after the fall of the Soviet Union, the value placed on democracy by formerly ambivalent parties during military dictatorships, and, in many cases, the newfound respect for social movement allies who helped resist military rule. The parties I have selected all have explicitly advocated and campaigned on the proposal of “deepening” democracy through institutions of "popular participation" that go beyond representation. In addition, once in office they often banded together with mayors in other parties to advocate adequate local funding and autonomy to ensure effective decentralization. Finally, despite impressive showings in presidential elections for many of these parties (often receiving the second-largest share of the vote), none of them controls enough seats in national-level congresses to legislate any of their own policies; thus they have turned to the municipal level in order to implement their programs.

Implementing Popular Participation

Although a host of leftist parties in municipal office have attempted to mobilize increased participation, the successful implementation of participatory programs has varied. Before describing these variations, let me explain the dimensions of "successful participatory programs." Loosely following Berry et al. (1993:54-61), I distinguish between successful and unsuccessful participatory programs based on the criteria of breadth, depth, and continuity. Breadth refers to the extent to which all citizens are afforded the opportunity and encouraged to participate, and can be indicated by how many people participate and how representative they are of the population of the city. Depth refers to the extent to which their participation actually influences policy decisions, and can be indicated by the range of decisions over which citizens have input and the degree to which that input matters (whether citizens inform, consult, implement, oversee, or decide upon policy). Continuity refers to the regularity and the duration of citizen participation programs. Programs in which many people can and do participate in significant ways over a wide range of issues on a regular basis over a long period of time are more “successful” than those in which few people can or do participate in relatively trivial ways over few issues on an infrequent basis or for a short time.

Beginning with the less successful programs, in Fortaleza, the petista mayor Maria Luiza Fontenele (1986-1988) targeted popular participation towards pressuring the state and national governments for more funding through occasional protests. Her administration is widely held to have been "an unmitigated disaster" (Nylen 1995:28). Azevedo (1988:46,47) writes that in Fortaleza, “after three years of popular government, neither councils nor any other regular

\[7\] A member of the PT is called a “petista.”
channels of popular participation exist” and “not a single important advance in popular participation within the municipal administration has occurred.” Regular, widespread participation never adhered under the PT's Luiza Erundina in São Paulo (1989-1992) or under the IU's Alfonso Barrantes in Lima, Peru (1984-1986), either. The head of the Integrated Project of Education and Participation under Erundina, Felix Sanchez, reported that the low levels of participation, the lack of impact of participation, and the inability to create a clear participatory program were major problems for Erundina’s administration, especially since she had “promised to govern with popular councils” (Personal Interview, 6/18/97; Jacobi 1991 also reports low levels of participation and that those who participated were nearly all PT members). As for Lima, one successful participatory innovation was the famous “Glass of Milk” program, which involved thousands of women in distributing free milk to young children and lactating mothers. Other participatory programs were in service provision or directed toward pressuring national institutions for services, such that actual decision-making powers were never devolved to citizens (Chirinos 1986:10).

Montevideo. The Frente Amplio’s Tabaré Vázquez (1990-1994) led a highly successful decentralization of administrative services in Montevideo and created a new neighborhood council system which stimulated district-level participation on a host of issues. Initially, the administration divided the city into 18 zones and created zonal communal centers (CCZs) with an appointed coordinator. In each zone, public meetings were held to decide upon the budget allocation within the zone. Approximately 25,000 people participated in dozens of such meetings to discuss the 1991 municipal budget (Portillo 1991:65). Public assemblies were also held in the CCZs "to sound out opinions on ways of organizing social participation in a decentralized scheme," resulting in the 1991 "Montevideo in Forum" central meeting (Pérez Piera 1992:94). This expanded participation in the CCZs to include an elected local board (junta local) of five members with decision-making authority, and an elected neighborhood council (consejo vecinal) with between 25 and 40 members who meet publicly twice a month and have a consultative role. The councils decide on the zone's budget and public service priorities, propose projects and improvements for the zone, and act as monitors over government implementation. Mayor Vázquez also promoted participation by rotating the weekly city council meetings to a different neighborhood each week and offering citizens the opportunity to publicly air requests and complaints. The success of the decentralization and participation program helped the FA win re-election in 1994, and they may win again next year.

Porto Alegre. Likewise, PT mayor Olívio Dutra (1989-1992) developed a new popular decision-making process in Porto Alegre known as the orçamento participativo (OP--participatory budget process). Dutra's administration divided the city into sixteen regions and held open assemblies in which participants presented investment proposals. Following this, administration officials held several more assemblies in which they explained the budget process and participants debated the investment priorities of the district. In the last meeting, they elected two representatives to the municipal-level budget council, which negotiated the budget for public works with the mayor, and several more delegates to monitor these proceedings, keep representatives informed of changes in
the neighborhood, and ensure that the administration carried out the projects the district had proposed. The OP "eventually became the central policy mechanism of the entire administration. By the third year after it was created, practically every decision that involved government spending had to be approved by the municipal budget council" (Abers 1996:45). In the wake of the success of the OP, the PT was re-elected twice (1993-1996, 1997-2000), and subsequent PT administrations expanded it to include five “thematic councils” organized around issues which encompassed the city as a whole, including transportation, education, and health.. In addition, the OP is now being used in many other cities throughout Brazil, including some governed by parties other than the PT.

Libertador. Finally, LCR's Aristóbulo Isturiz (1992-1995) initiated a similar decentralized participation process implemented by strengthening participation and government presence in the 19 already-existing parishes of the Libertador municipality in Caracas (which makes up about 60% of the city). In addition to the newly democratically-elected parish boards (juntas parroquiales--with between 5 and 9 members), a "technical cabinet" was created to work with the parish board and represent the city administration. The technical cabinet consisted of an engineer, an architect, a group of urban maintenance workers, two police officers, and an auditor. In order to encourage citizen participation, Isturiz's administration promoted the creation of "parish governments," which consisted of the parish boards, the technical cabinets, and the various neighborhood associations and community organizations, as well as anyone else who wanted to participate, and operated through public assemblies (Alvarez 1997:189). Each parish government collectively formulated a budget (the Parish Works Budget) for public projects using the funds it received from the administration based on a set formula involving the population size and the gravity of problems. In addition, the parish boards attempted to set up democratic elections in the neighborhood associations (which normally had its leaders appointed by AD and COPEI city councillors) and organized new cultural, environmental, and sports organizations which would collaborate with the parish government. Though Isturiz failed to win over the citizens entirely with his project and narrowly lost re-election, significant participation was achieved during his administration in the parish governments, and some of these continued operating under subsequent the AD administration.

The First Question: Explaining Failure and Success

All these administrations faced some common challenges--decrepit municipal equipment, bloated lists of poorly qualified or "ghost" public workers hired on clientelist criteria, lack of a majority on the city council (except in Lima), high rates of debt, lack of administrative experience, electoral support of about a third of the city population, lack of support from the media, and enormous pressure from electors with long lists of repressed social demands--but none of these significantly differentiates the cases. That any of these governments succeeded at all in these conditions borders on miraculous.

8See Jacobi 1994; Bava 1995 for the Brazilian cases; Harnecker 1995 also includes the LCR and FA cases; for the PRD in Mexico City, see Taibo 1998. As of yet, I know little about Rosario, San Salvador, and Asunción.
What, then, accounts for the failure of Leftist municipal governments to institutionalize participatory programs and break the traditional clientelistic, anti-popular mode of local politics in cities such as Lima, Fortaleza, and São Paulo on the one hand, and the relative success of such programs in cities like Montevideo, Porto Alegre, and Caracas, on the other? Existing literature has yet to produce an attractive model for explaining the differences in the achievement of participatory institutions. In my view, an effective model of participation should combine perspectives from three levels. At the macro-level, one should examine the conditions from “above” which encourage or discourage a local government’s attempts to implement participatory programs. At the meso-level, one must analyze how the local governments design the institutions for participation. Finally, at the micro-level, one can study the citizens themselves and their desires with regard to participation. Literature on participation thus far has failed to recognize and make distinct these levels or ignored one or more of them. In the following sections I will outline the current literature on participation at these different levels and then attempt to synthesize the different strands to produce a model, and finally apply the model in the six cases described above.

Macro-level: Decentralization

Decentralization and the possibilities it arguably affords "participatory" development (and democracy) have received a lot of attention in academia and in international agencies like the World Bank and the UNDP. The resulting literature is vast and initially confusing, with multiple definitions, dimensions, and models of decentralization, and conflicting hypotheses concerning its relationship with participation. Given the plethora of understandings of the concept, Leonard (1982) concludes that a single universally applicable typology of decentralization is not possible. A general definition of decentralization which captures parts of all the conceptions of it is the transfer of either resources, responsibilities for public services, or decision-making power over those items away from the central government to either lower levels of government, dispersed central state agencies, or the private sector. Instead of a typology combining these dimensions, I will classify the various approaches to decentralization in the literature in order to discover the basic arguments about what effect it may have on participation. I label the different perspectives Developmentalist, Democratizing, or Centralist.

The developmentalists, led by Rondinelli (1989) and including the mainstream development donors, advocate decentralization because they believe it will lead to improved provision of services and more equitable economic development. They focus mostly on the technical aspects of which levels of government (or the private sector) should provide which services, and they often emphasize "subsidiarity," the notion that the lowest possible level of government should provide the service. The logic of their argument is that decentralization brings government "closer to the people," facilitating local participation (especially of the poor), and thus allowing the government to better understand the people's needs. Their vision of participation generally sees citizens as information-providers so that experts may improve public policy design.9

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9For example, the World Bank introduced a new element for analyzing poverty called “participatory poverty
Scholars with a democratizing approach also appreciate that decentralization may open the way for popular participation, but they view this as participation in making decisions about policy design and implementation, not just in consultation, and they are more sanguine about decentralization in general. Many of these authors argue that depending on exactly what is devolved to whom (or where), decentralization may lead to greater citizen input, the strengthening of local elites, or even the strengthening of the central state. In Latin America, responsibilities for services have frequently been transferred to the local level but not financial support or democratic representation. Along with national government cuts in social spending and efforts to delegitimize collective social actors, this kind of decentralization has led to the "fragmentation of public space and the retrogression of democracy" (Bava 1996:55, emphasis in original). Some democratizers accuse the developmentalists of using decentralizing and democratic discourse as a "smoke screen" for the advance of privatization, massive concentration of economic power, the weakening of the State's regulatory powers, and the strengthening of the State's ability to monitor and control the population (Felicissimo 1994:50; and Slater 1989). For democratizers attempting to avoid what they call the neoliberal model of decentralization, the emphasis is on transferring responsibilities, resources, and participation in decision-making to lower levels of government because of the value they place on participation itself as an extension of citizenship (Felicissimo 1994:50-1; Pérez Pierra 1992).

While developmentalists and democratizers both see decentralization as at least potentially beneficial to citizen participation, centralists criticize the notion that lower levels of government are "closer" to the people and therefore more appropriate spheres for encouraging participation (Nunes 1996:37; and Melo 1996; Prud'homme 1995; McConnell 1966). Centralists argue that decentralization transfers social conflicts as well as resources and responsibilities to the local level, where there is greater political inequality, thus reinforcing relationships of subordination and "pulverizing the relative strength of subaltern actors" (Nunes 1996:37; McConnell 1966:107). Corruption and clientelism are also more prevalent at the local level, making participation unattractive to many citizens (and making participation itself not democratic). In addition to the dangers to participation, decentralization hinders development because local governments are less technically capable than the central government, because the State loses regulatory capacity and fiscal control, and because it generates "municipal hobbesianism," a war among cities to attract both industry and federal funding (Melo 1996; Salmen 1994). Some authors describe this as the "mainstream" or "pragmatic" view of participation (Martinussen 1997:234-5; Schönwalder 1997:756).

Icochea (1996) argues that in Chile responsibilities were transferred to local governments, but no representation, while in Colombia there was local democracy, but few responsibilities. This kind of observation has been made in other parts of the world as well. In a discussion of decentralization in West Africa, Ribot (1998:4) shows that "when local structures have an iota of representativity, no powers are devolved to them, and when local structures have powers, they are not representative but rather centrally controlled." He argues that in some cases decentralization has thus maintained and even furthered "ongoing legislative apartheid" by reinforcing the power of unrepresentative local chiefs (1).
Meso-level: Political Parties and Strategies

Studies of citizen mobilization often focus on political parties and their attempts to use such mobilization in order to garner electoral support (Collier & Collier 1991; Collier forthcoming). Likewise, some scholars of municipal participation have focused on the strategies the ruling parties use and the degree to which conflict among and within parties is played out within participatory programs to explain their relative success. Schönwalder’s (1998) study of an IU administration in Peru argues, for instance, that a "radical-democratic" approach--in which popular participation is viewed as extending citizenship--and a "revolutionary" approach--which sees participatory programs as the embryos of a revolutionary movement--both failed to achieve sustained participation. The revolutionary approach discouraged participation because it was "politicized and instrumentalized by competing left factions" which tried "to dominate and to use these [urban popular] movements as vehicles for amassing political support" (78, 88). In addition, the participatory organizations created under both approaches lacked control over resources, and few concrete results could thus be achieved. In both cases, participation quickly diminished. Nylen (1996) suggests that conflicts between moderate factions in municipal administrations and radical factions outside them can destroy participation programs by discouraging participants. In a similar vein, Berry et al. (1993:50) examine participation in five U.S. cities and argue that one of the keys to success was that in the original design of all the programs, there was a double commitment to both keep partisan politics out of the neighborhood participation programs and to make policy issues “become part and parcel of the system’s daily operation.”

Micro-level: Social Movements

One challenge that these administrations all faced was their relationship with social movements which had traditionally operated through opposing and making demands upon the State, rather than cooperating with it. Several authors suggest this as a problem for successfully implementing participation in Brazil. Assies (1997:114) argues that the Brazilian Left gradually moved from viewing social movements as part of a parallel power strategy to seeing them as an arena for practicing citizenship and creating a new democratic political culture. Yet he agrees with Doimo (1995) that this process was difficult, and that the PT’s difficulties in constructing participatory popular councils were due at least partly to the conflicting ethics contained in Brazilian social movements. The “expressive-disruptive” ethic, with its “logic of direct action,” confronted the “integrative-corporatist” ethic which was necessary for following the “rules of procedure” in the popular councils (Assies 1997:113).

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11 One example of "municipal hobbesianism" comes from Brazil. In order to raise Bocaiuva do Sul's population and thus its share of federal funding, Mayor Elcio Berti recently announced that he would distribute free Viagra. His town had 8,750 people in 1989 after it was split into two municipalities (SF Examiner 6/25/98).

Alfred Stepan (1997) suggests that this is a general problem for consolidating democracies. He contrasts the two types of society needed for a transition away from authoritarian rule with that needed for a consolidated democracy. The values and language of "Ethical Civil Society," which is a contributor and sometime leader of transitions, often conflict with those of "Political Society," which is a requisite of consolidation. While ethical civil society in opposition claims "truth," perceives itself as the nation, rejects internal differences and represses conflicts, dismisses compromises and routinized institutions, and operates outside the State, political society in a consolidated democracy operates around interests, contains many different groups, attempts to organize and represent differences and conflicts, and accepts compromise and working with State institutions.

Abers (1996) combines a meso- and micro-level approach in her comparison of six PT-administered cities. Though her research focuses elsewhere, she concludes by proposing three possible explanations for why the PT administration in Porto Alegre allowed the devolution of much more decision-making power to the citizens than other PT municipal governments. The first is that while PT mayors often feared creating strong participatory programs because their opponents might capture the new public spaces, the PT’s main opposition party in Porto Alegre was the PDT, a center-left party and sometime ally, and PT administrations in other cities faced more conservative opposition. The second is that Porto Alegre had a "robust history of grassroots organization, especially at the neighborhood level" and "presumably, highly organized movements will pressure an administration to develop participatory mechanisms" (50). The third is that the relationship between the party and the administration was less tense in Porto Alegre and therefore "the grassroots sectors of the party might have been more successful in pressuring the government to create participatory mechanisms" (50).

A Tri-level Model

The model I will develop in order to explain the differences in the degree of institutionalization of participatory programs in the larger comparison set will combine all three levels. From the macro-level decentralization debate I take the hypothesis of the democratizers that there must be significant and effective decentralization before local governments can successfully involve citizens in decision-making processes. People will not participate in local government unless such participation is meaningful. The more resources, responsibilities, and decision-making authority are transferred downwards, the greater the likelihood of institutionalizing participation because local governments can offer citizens results for their participation. I will view the centralists’ notion that decentralization endangers participation as a rival hypothesis. From the meso-level perspective, I will argue that the strategy the ruling party uses to implement participation is crucial. If the participation program operates in ways that are too partisan, clientelistic, or confrontational, or if participation includes only citizen consultation rather than decision-making over important issues, the program has less chance of success. At the micro-level, my hypothesis is that where social movements operate in an oppositional, revindicative mode (or “expressive-disruptive” rather than “integrative-corporatist”) and are
strongly allied with the party in local government, participation will be more difficult to institutionalize. Abers’ suggestions will be considered rival hypotheses. Here, I will briefly examine the hypotheses from each level in light of preliminary research on the six cases described above (see Table 1 for a summary picture of each case).

Table 1: Determinants of Participatory Success

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Degree of Effective Decentralization</th>
<th>Type of Party Strategy</th>
<th>Type of Neighborhood Mvmnt History</th>
<th>Degree of Success of Participatory Programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fortaleza</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Dual Power</td>
<td>Opposition; Ties to Mayor</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lima</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Dual Power --&gt; Responsible Gov’t</td>
<td>Strong Opposition; Ties to Ruling Party</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Paulo</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Dual Power --&gt; Responsible Gov’t</td>
<td>Strong Opposition; Ties to Mayor &amp; Ruling Party</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montevideo</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Responsible Gov’t</td>
<td>Weak; No Ties to Mayor or Ruling Party</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libertador (Caracas)</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Responsible Gov’t</td>
<td>Weak &amp; Clientelist; No Ties to Mayor or Ruling Party</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porto Alegre</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Responsible Gov’t</td>
<td>Clientelist; No Ties to Mayor or Ruling Party</td>
<td>High</td>
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To begin with, following decentralizing measures in 1988 and 1989 in Venezuela, Brazil, and Uruguay, local governments in these countries had many more resources and responsibilities than before, and more than their counterparts in Peru (even following the 1985 moves towards decentralization there). Both the IU administration in Lima and the PT administration in Fortaleza preceded the decentralization efforts in Peru and Brazil, respectively. Though the PT won the mayorship of São Paulo after the decentralizing constitution of 1988, federal and state tiers of government ignored the changes and delayed and withheld revenues destined for municipal coffers in several cities led by the PT, and especially São Paulo, as it is the nation's
largest and most visible city. The Causa R in Caracas, the Broad Front in Montevideo, and the Workers’ Party in Porto Alegre thus provided more services and disposed of more resources than did the IU in Lima and the PT in Fortaleza and São Paulo, and were correspondingly better able to implement participation.

The strategies towards participatory institutions these parties used also distinguishes the cases from one another: one group of parties followed a "dual power" strategy and the other, a "responsible government" strategy. The first conforms to how parties on the Left traditionally saw social organizations as spaces for political recruitment, often through distributing patronage, and for challenging the ruling government. Significant segments of the parties elected in Lima, Fortaleza, and São Paulo entered city government with this dual power vision of citizen participation. Previously organized social movements (which is where the Left parties had their largest following) were to be the leaders of the new popular councils organized mostly in poor areas. These would "direct" the mayor, eventually supplanting the old, bourgeois, (merely) representative city councils and begin to gain control over the State. The councils (and the administration itself) often took a confrontational approach towards state- and federal-level governments. This strategy led to chaotic administrations, the continuation of clientelist and partisan practices, a strong backlash from higher levels of government and business sectors, and, most importantly for our purposes, to the failure of to achieve widespread participation. After the mayors in Lima and São Paulo converted to a more moderate strategy mid-way through their term, their radical supporters felt betrayed and staged serious protests against Erundina and Barrantes.

The responsible government strategy did not envision revolution. Instead, participation was seen as a means of simultaneously creating a culture of strong citizenship, overcoming clientelism and corruption, inverting the priorities of government to favor the disadvantaged, and presenting the image that the Left could govern responsibly, responsively, and cleanly without fostering chaos. With the "responsible government" strategy, the new participatory

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13 This has been reported in various sources, such as Sader & Silverstein, 1991:123; Branford & Kucinski, 1995:83; Jacobi, 1994, but they do not present concrete evidence. The reason for this is most likely that the revenues received by municipalities from the federal and state governments through convênios (negotiated transfers) are usually not documented nor accountable, even though the amounts of money can be extremely large, reaching up to 100% of the documented budget (World Bank, 1992:12, 21). The PT fared better financially in Porto Alegre than it did in São Paulo because the PDT held the governorship of the state of Rio Grande do Sul. The PDT did not cut off Dutra's administration in Porto Alegre, whereas the PMDB governor did withhold funds from Erundina in São Paulo. The PMDB opposed the PT in general and particularly during the 1989 presidential elections.

14 For the PT in Brazil, Nylen (1995) labeled these orthodox and heterodox; in Peru, Schönwalder (1998) called the strategies “revolutionary” and “radical democracy.” One might also use the terms “Leninist” and “Gramscian.”

15 Fontenele described the strategy as one of creating Soviet-style workers' councils (Interview with author, 7/97). Erundina seems to regret her initial application of the strategy of embryos of workers' power independent from the State (in Harnecker 1995:207). For the "double-space" strategy of the IU in Lima, see Calderón & Valdeavellano 1991; Chirinos 1986.

16 See Bittar’s (1992) description of the Modo Petista de Governar (PT way of governing), interviews with
organizations are supposed to be open to citizens of any (or no) political affiliation and free from party membership pressures, to be universal rather than particularistic (in that the results of their actions benefit the city residents in general rather than specific constituents), and to cooperate with the State, rather than confront it. In Montevideo, Porto Alegre, and Caracas, the parties adopted this non-confrontational, gradualist participatory approach, emphasizing the opportunity for the participation of all citizens. This allowed for relatively effective and innovative government, the prevention of the alienation of higher tiers of government and business sectors, and the implementation of a program of decentralized participation involving large numbers of people.

In part, this variation in strategy might be explained by the institutional context faced by each party. In the more decentralized contexts, the local leaders did not need to adopt a confrontational stance because they had access to revenue and they had jurisdiction over important services. In the more centralized systems, the local leaders used their newfound power to organize local residents to pressure the national governments for decentralization. Indeed, the mayors of Lima and Fortaleza (Barrantes and Fontenele) took central roles in national movements of mayors during the 1980s which culminated in decentralization efforts. This was not the only important difference among these cases, though. Just as important, I think, in accounting for why the strategies differed are the local history of social movements and the different relationships they had with the ruling parties. In Fortaleza, Lima, and São Paulo, the ruling parties were all strongly linked to radical urban movements with a history of opposition to the State, and in the latter cities, these movements were quite strong. In the three other cities, neighborhood movements were weak and/or tied in clientelist relations to parties other than those implementing the participatory programs.

In summary, a combination of more centralized government and close connections between mayors and oppositional urban movements encouraged a dual power participatory strategy. Alongside a lack of finances and jurisdiction over government functions, this strategy inhibited the institutionalization of popular participation in Fortaleza, Lima, and São Paulo. On the other hand, more decentralized government and mayoral autonomy from oppositional social movements paved the way for a responsible government strategy of popular participation. This more moderate strategy, combined with the resources, responsibilities, and authority made available in the more decentralized systems, facilitated the institutionalization of participatory programs in Montevideo, Porto Alegre, and Caracas. This is the model I will seek to strengthen.

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Evidence that the participatory programs of the PT in Porto Alegre and LCR in Libertador were not clientelistic and partisan comes primarily from the absence of accusations there and interviews with party leaders (Harnecker 1995), while for Montevideo there exist, in addition, opinion polls showing that the majority of the citizens support the participatory programs because the program leaders did not act in "obviously partisan, manipulative, or clientelistic ways" (Sierra & Charbonnier 1993:14).
by examining these hypotheses in the other major cities with Leftist municipal governments. This investigation will take up a comparatively smaller portion of my dissertation (a chapter or maybe two), and will be conducted primarily through the use of secondary sources.

The Second Question: Do Participation and Decentralization Deepen Democracy?

In Montevideo, Porto Alegre, and Libertador, regular and meaningful participation took place on a wide scale through a decentralized system. Though there have been other relatively successful cases of citizen participation (including Belo Horizonte in Brazil and Ciudad Bolívar in Venezuela), the ones I have chosen stand out in the literature. The major part of my dissertation will use these three cases to test hypotheses advanced by theorists of democracy with regard to whether participation and decentralization should deepen democracy at the local level. Democracy is clearly a multidimensional variable, and since I am not attempting here to distinguish between democratic and authoritarian rule, I am also conceiving democracy here as a continuous variable, for which a range of values may exist. In addition to the existence of mechanisms of citizen participation which go beyond occasional voting, then, deeper democracy has a governmental performance axis and a citizen performance axis. It requires that government performs more accountably (such that its deliberations and actions are more public, and corruption and clientelism are curtailed if not eliminated), responsively (such that citizens' demands receive equal and sufficient attention), and effectively (such that the quality of public services improves), and that citizens become more active in civic organizations, more supportive of democratic institutions, and more integrated into their communities (such that hostility towards others decreases and tolerance increases). Improvements along any of these dimensions may occur without simultaneous improvements along the other dimensions, and I may devise some sort of additive scaling system to score the depth of democracy in each of the cities.

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18I will continue considering rival hypotheses as I add cases, but one can already see that the centralists’ argument that decentralization discourages participation is not borne out by the present cases. Neither are the variables suggested by Abers. Her hypotheses that participation will increase the more allied the ruling party is with its local opposition and the stronger the neighborhood organizations are not supported by the Libertador and Montevideo cases, where the local opposition was fierce and neighborhood organizations were weak. Abers correctly highlights the less conflictive relationship between the party and the administration in successful cases, but the important result of this was not the one she presents. Instead of allowing grassroots organizations to pressure the administration, what this meant was that factions did not compete as heavily in the participation programs.

19Within Brazil, many PT-administered cities have followed Porto Alegre's example, including Belo Horizonte, but the literature illustrates that popular participation has advanced most in Porto Alegre (Bava 1995:176; Abers 1996:43). Caroni municipality in Ciudad Bolívar is significantly smaller and less important than the cities I have chosen, so does not present as promising a case for comparison.

20I consider this last dimension, governmental effectiveness, as part of “deeper” democracy for two reasons. First, the political actors who are implementing the participatory programs do so (see Harnecker 1995), and second, survey researchers in Latin America using the new Latinobarómetro are finding that “widespread criticism of inadequate public services has been natural [and that] citizens are turning to demand and will increasingly demand that democratic political systems work more as they are intended to work,” suggesting that citizens share the notion that democracy ought to include effective government (Turner & Martz 1997:73).
Democratic theorists are divided over whether or not the kinds of decentralized participation described above tend to further the other elements of deeper democracy I have just defined. One group thinks decentralization and participation doom democracy, another holds that they are the keys to deepening it, and a third argues that they do not have any significant effects. This debate in some form or another has lasted centuries, yet few scholars have attempted comparative empirical studies to adjudicate between the various claims.

The doom-sayers, beginning with Plato and moving on through Mosca, Schumpeter, and more recently including Moynihan and Huntington, argue that too much participation leads to inefficiency, ungovernability, and citizen frustration. These thinkers believe that government should be the province of an educated elite, and that, as Huntington argued, a "surge of participatory democracy" weakens government by overloading the system with demands and making it impossible to govern effectively (1981:219, as cited in Berry et al 1993:8). Those who participate end up alienated because their demands cannot be met (Huntington 1975; Moynihan 1969). The doom-sayers also include those who prefer centralized government because they believe that local politics is the home of corruption and clientelism rather than democratic citizenship (McConnell 1966; Nunes 1996). Finally, Ribeiro (1995), who otherwise seems to favor decentralized participation, warns that rather than furthering democratization, it has frequently led to low representativity of the participants, predominance of neighborhood interests over city-wide interests, and leftist clientelism.

Like the doom-sayers, the advocates of decentralized government and citizen participation have a long pedigree. Rousseau, and later John Stuart Mill, argued that participation educates people to become full citizens, reduces conflict by helping people accept government decisions, and integrates the community (see Pateman 1970). Toqueville went beyond Mill in advocating citizen participation and emphasizing the virtues of local government. More recently, scholars with varying research agendas, such as bureaucracy (Hagedorn 1995; Handler 1996), development (Rondinelli et al 1989; Dillinger 1994), state reform (Burki & Edwards 1996; Bradford 1994), urban planning (Borja 1996; Borja & Castells 1997), and urban politics (Dowbor 1998; Felicissimo 1994) have all argued for the decentralization of government and increased citizen participation in the design and implementation of public policy. Depending on the author, these changes would make government more responsive, effective, and efficient, citizens more socially integrated and public-spirited, and, because of the changes in government and citizenry, local economies more prosperous and more equitable. Berry et al. (1993) set out to test some of these claims against those of the doom-sayers. They found that decentralized participation in their cities yielded higher levels of government responsiveness, honesty, and legitimacy (or the public perception of these items), led to greater sense of community and tolerance among citizens, defused hostility among groups in the city; and did not create gridlock, increase conflict, introduce racial or economic biases into policymaking, or lead to frustration and disenchantment with government.21

21Given methodological problems of Berry et al.’s study (Abers & Heskin 1995), it would be unwise to consider the debate over decentralized participation as resolved. They rely too heavily on public opinion surveys,
Scholars in the last group propose that decentralization and participation are insignificant. Martins (1998:47) argues that they will not make a difference because local governments are limited by the "capitalist character of state structures" which means that the primary task of government is "the reproduction of capital," and thus presumably any strengthening of the State comes at the expense of popular sectors and of democracy. Slater (1990:502), in a similar vein, claims that in the context of the continuing debt crisis, newly opened economies, and the decreasing State role compared to transnational capital, "it is difficult to imagine how 'decentralizing the state' [including local-level participation] is going to have any meaningful effect on the promotion of... 'equitable economic development'” in order to sustain democracy in poverty-stricken Latin America. Shuman (1998:36-7) suggests that political reforms and strengthening civic groups will not enhance community, and that what is needed instead is to strengthen local control over the economy through local investment, and the use of local inputs and labor. Nylen (forthcoming), who generally looks favorably on the PT municipal administrations, argues that popular participation in them has not translated into more positive evaluations of Brazilian democracy or of politics. He bases this argument on public opinion polls of the general Brazilian population, though, not on attitudes of residents of PT-administered cities or participants in their programs.

The effects of decentralized participation on furthering democracy are unlikely to be the same in each city, however. While the relatively simple hypotheses proposed above will not help distinguish between cases, recent debates over State-society relations contain several possible avenues for advancing in that direction. In the evolution of this literature, many authors have moved beyond the notion of zero-sum relations between the State and society. O'Donnell (1997:15), for example, argues that the current task for those seeking further democratization in Latin America is to direct the reform of the State towards the "extension of civil citizenship....[I]t is wrong to think of the legal state as in a zero-sum position in relation to society; quite the contrary, the more the former extends itself as rule of law, the more it usually facilitates and supports the independence of and the strength of the latter." Other authors have furthered the idea that this reinforcing may be mutual and may occur through new forms of cooperation between civil society and what O'Donnell sees as another dimension of the State: the bureaucracy.

Evans (1996a; 1996b; 1997; 1998) has been a leading proponent of the notion of "state-society synergy," which occurs when state agencies and civic organizations possess cooperative, trusting ties with one another. When such synergistic relations occur, they produce more disciplined and better-informed public agencies and more civic engagement, which result in more optimal development outcomes (better quality of life). Evans asks, under what conditions will synergy emerge? He answers that "egalitarian societies with robust public bureaucracies diminishing the strength of their claims, and they fail to justify their case selection convincingly.

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[including public servants constrained by powerful internal norms and a dependably rewarding system of long-term career benefits] provide the most fertile ground for synergistic state-society relations" (1996b:1128). These pre-conditions combined with the facts that the State's economic role is everywhere under attack and that elites will usually view attempts at public-private cooperation involving subordinate groups as threats, make the prospects for synergy bleak, especially in developing countries (1996b; 1997). However, Evans also argues that synergy is "constructable" if reformers in the State find innovative ways of organizing cooperative institutions and of presenting problems and interests as common to all involved (1996b:1129).

Tendler (1997) provides several examples of synergistic public-private cooperation in northeastern Brazil. Her explanation for "good government in the tropics" focuses on the ways in which the state government in Ceará provided incentives for public workers to improve their performance. These included publicly praising and rewarding good service, allowing workers to perform a variety of tasks, and, most importantly, fostering trusting, collaborative relationships between public servants and their clients by providing information to citizens and encouraging them to monitor public workers and demand improvements.23

What can we take from the discussion of synergy? First, deeper democracy (and synergy) should be more likely where there is greater social equality, where public bureaucracies are stronger, and where elites do not feel threatened by the attempt at collaboration between the State and subaltern groups. Second, deeper democracy is more likely where the participatory programs recast existing problems in ways which encourage all local actors to see the city and its problems as commonly shared and to take part in resolving them. Third, participatory programs should produce better results where they integrate public workers in community decision-making processes.

A last hypothesis should be introduced on the basis of the cases I have selected. One of the major differences between the three parties selected here, and one which may influence the democratization outcome, lies in their different internal structures.24 The Frente Amplio is a coalition of several parties ranging from former guerrilla movements to social democrats, while the Partido dos Trabalhadores required that its constituent parties renounce individual existence and become “tendencies” within a single party. In contrast, the Causa R has no traditional

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23 Though Tendler explicitly de-emphasizes the importance of decentralization and participation, it is clear from her case studies that, while municipal government did not play a crucial role, the decentralized administration of the Ceará state government and significant citizen input into the design and implementation of policy were quite important.

24 Other potentially important differences between the cases are captured in the preceding hypotheses or have been eliminated through the selection of cases. Each city is roughly of the same size--Montevideo and Porto Alegre each have approximately 1.5 million people, while Libertador has about 2 million--thus the difficulty of organizing widespread participation should not differ significantly. They each faced economic problems during their initial years, so financial difficulties due to temporary economic changes should not differ. And, at the national level, presidents with agendas opposite those of these cities' mayors were in office, thus no national political context favored one of the municipal administrations more than another.
membership (anyone may declare him/herself a member, and no party cards are given), no internal hierarchy, no voting, and uses consensual decision making and near complete autonomy for local party units (Dept. de Investigación 1994:86). The existence of factions within the party is certain, however, since it divided in two in 1997. The way that each of these parties handles internal competition and conflict through various degrees of recognition of factions (i.e., forming coalitions, legitimating “tendencies,” or suppression) may spill over into the programs for participation. If factional disputes take place within the participatory institutions, they may immobilize, radicalize, or destroy them.

Finally, if indeed governmental and/or citizen performance improved in any of these cities, it is possible that the improvements would be due to something other than decentralized citizen participation. Several alternatives are possible. It may be that one or more of the reformist mayors is unusually capable of eradicating corruption and making government open without relying on citizen watch-dogs, or that an administration may dispose of greater financial resources with which to improve public services. In addition, one or more of the cities may possess a citizenry which was already especially organized, public-spirited, or integrated.

Research Design and Indicators

Overall, I have two sets of hypotheses. The first set involves the straightforward question of whether the participatory systems in these three cities deepen democracy: one school affirmed that notion, another argued that they would make no difference, and a third warned that they would threaten democracy. The second set specifies the conditions under which deeper democracy becomes more likely. To evaluate these hypotheses, I will conduct a series of comparisons. For the general arguments regarding the effects of decentralized participation, I will compare each of the participatory administrations in Porto Alegre, Montevideo and Libertador with urban governance generally in Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela, and with the administration prior to it in the same city (and the one following it in the case of Libertador, which allows me to ask the interesting question of what happens to decentralized participation programs when a traditional political party returns to local office). This strategy of comparison represents the method of agreement, as the focus administrations would hypothetically share both decentralized participation and some value of democracy. For the hypotheses regarding the conditions under which deeper democracy is most likely, I will compare across the three cities generally and within each city across two selected districts, one where citizen participation is relatively strong and one where it is comparatively weak. In Libertador, these will be Antímano and either Santa Teresa, Sucre, or Caricuao, respectively. In the other two cities, I do not yet have enough district-level information to begin selecting.

Both sets of hypotheses require examining the dimensions of deeper democracy: government accountability, effectiveness, and responsiveness, on the one hand, and the organization, democratic values, and integration of citizens, on the other. Indicators of government performance will include the following (with sources denoted in parenthesis--see below for more on these sources). For accountability, the number of corruption scandals, and the
perception of government openness and of the existence of corruption and clientelism among citizens and leaders will all be investigated (newspapers; interviews). For effectiveness and responsiveness, the indicators will include the quality of public services measured by the increase in the number of people with access to potable water, sewage connections, electricity, public transportation and by the numbers of hospital beds and doctors per patient, and students per teacher (government records; scholarly and journalistic research reports); citizen perception of how well the government responds to needs and of whether their participation is meaningful (interviews); and the kinds of people who are active in participatory institutions--whether they belong to a particular party, social class, neighborhood, or pre-existing organization--and whether they personally benefit from participation as opposed to the community in which they live or the city as a whole (interviews). Indicators of citizen performance will include the number of civic organizations; the frequency and type of participation; the level of support for democratic institutions like local and national executives and legislatures, neighborhood councils; and values like tolerance, trust, and sense of community (government records; research reports; interviews).

Indicators for the independent variables specified in the second set of hypotheses are also necessary. The level of social equality will be measured by the size of the difference in income level between the richest and poorest groups (government records).\textsuperscript{25} The degree of integration of public workers into participatory processes, of factional conflict, and of threat perceived by elites, as well as the way urban problems are formulated, will be directly observed in the local participatory institutions and asked in interviews. Finally, indicators of the robustness of public bureaucracies will include the relative numbers and positions of political appointees versus civil servants hired on a merit basis and answers to the interview questions regarding corruption, clientelism, and quality of public services mentioned above.

Data will be collected from a variety of sources. I will rely primarily on interviews with three types of people: public leaders such as administration officials, party officials, social movement leaders; past and present participants in the new institutions; and citizens who did not participate in the local government’s participatory programs. For the first group, the questions will be largely open-ended. For the latter two groups, the questions will be more close-ended and some will correspond to those asked in local, national, and international surveys (the Latinobarómetro) in order to facilitate cross-city, cross-national, and cross-temporal comparisons, and I may enlist the aid of local research units, such as CIEDUR in Montevideo.\textsuperscript{26} In addition, I will attend the meetings of the OP in Porto Alegre, the neighborhood councils in Montevideo, and the parish governments in Libertador. Secondary sources, including scholarly research (much has been written about Porto Alegre, especially, and the World Bank, the UNDP,  

\textsuperscript{25}Preliminary indications are that, as one might expect, social inequality is greater in urban Brazil than in Uruguay and Venezuela. In the former country’s urban areas, the richest decile earned nearly 40 times that of the poorest decile in 1990, while in that number drops to less than 10 in Uruguay and about 14 in Venezuela (ECLAC 1998:64-5).

\textsuperscript{26}I am currently preparing a list of the exact questions to be asked in the elite and survey interviews.
and local NGOs and research units like Polis in Brazil produce analyses of local government services), journalistic sources, opinions of local researchers, and especially government statistical records will all be consulted as well.
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